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Abstract 
 
This study centers on the subject of mergers and acquisitions by describing and analyzing the 
case-study of the acquisition of Carrefour Portugal by Sonae Distribuição. The main objectives 
of this study are to identify the reasons underlying the decision, to examine how the 
acquisition fits Sonae Distribuição’s strategy, and to analyze how the integration process is 
conducted and affects the value created by the acquisition. 
This case study clarifies that growth through value cr ation was the main reason behind 
Sonae’s decision of acquiring Carrefour-Portugal. The acquisition would allow Sonae to 
reinforce its position as number one in the Portuguese retail market and enlarge its market 
coverage. Moreover, the acquisition would boost the organic growth of the different business 
formats of the company. Economies of scale and scope, dimension gains and combination of 
complementary resources, namely creating stronger product and store portfolios and 
integrating competences that neither one could achieve alone, are the main potential synergies 
identified that enabled Sonae to achieve its objectiv s. 
The analysis demonstrates that the value created by this deal derives from the strategic fit of 
the acquisition, considering the strategic pillars of Sonae Distribuição, creating a unique 
resource complementarity. On the other hand, a succe sful post-acquisition integration process 
was conducted. The main aspects identified for thissuccessful process were the effective 
communication with every stakeholder, the cooperative environment established between the 
companies from the beginning, and the celerity of the process. Critical aspects such as 
familiarity with the sector and culture similarity were favorable to the deal, representing a 
remarkable fit. The complete integration within a single company allowed for the realization 
of the main synergies that motivated the deal, despite the adverse economic conjuncture. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have been one of themost widely used strategies by 
companies in their attempt to enhance their value creation potential. M&A allow for firms to 
react to new challenges and opportunities and, if done properly, may result in an increased 
market share, profitability and enterprise value. Paradoxically, a large amount of failures have 
been registered. Difficulties in realizing the desir d synergies inherent to the acquisition and 
successfully integrating the companies are the main aspects pointed out for these failures. The 
existing literature has identified the lack of atten ion to the strategic fit and to the integration 
process as the main causes for failure. 
These aspects make this a rather interesting subject to study: what leads a company to take a 
decision of acquiring another one, which aspects contribute for the potential value creation and 
which actions should a company take to effectively convert those potential synergies in actual 
value. 
To better understand the reasoning behind an acquisition, a case study approach was applied. 
This project will therefore center on the analysis of the acquisition of Carrefour-Portugal by 
Sonae Distribuição in the Portuguese retail sector. This case study comprises several 
characteristics that make this an important case to analyze. On the one hand, it has retailing as 
its background, a sector where M&A are commonly used as strategies to grow by creating 
value. Moreover, it takes place in Portugal, a mature market where M&A are giving their first 
steps. On the other hand, the case study appears to be a successful one, despite being very 
recent and thus not allowing for definitive conclusions to be drawn yet. 
The information contained in this case study was obtained from five main sources: books, 
scientific journals, internet research, media and iterviews with managers of Sonae 
Distribuição. Data from 2006-2007 was mostly used, as it was the most suitable one to analyze 
the market and the companies’ situation before the acquisition. On the other hand, in some 
cases it was not possible to obtain more recent data. As retailing is a highly competitive sector, 
firms are very concerned about keeping some information private, especially quantitative data. 
The project is divided in two parts. The first one pr sents the case study, as well as the profile 
of the companies involved, their strategies, and the background of the retailing industry, with a 
particular emphasis on the Portuguese case. The second part contains the subsequent case 
analysis, where the rationale behind the acquisition is analyzed and the decision is framed 
within the recent literature on M&A. The economic and strategic motivations for the 
acquisition are evaluated and the integration process is analyzed. The case analysis ends with a 
brief summary of the rationale behind the deal and the first results obtained.1  
 
                                                
1 The exhibits presented are essential to the comprehension of the case. The appendixes at the end of the project 
aim to complement the information presented in the project as well as the information contained in some exhibits. 
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PART I  – CASE STUDY 
“In this accelerated market, there’s always going to be winners and losers. Right now, it is Sonae who is 
winning. The Carrefour deal is a clinical striker’s goal. Jordão’s style.” 
In Jornal de Negócios2 
 
“I’m totally convinced that this operation that joints Sonae Distribuição and Carrefour-Portugal will belong 
to the minority group of cases that create value.” 
- Nuno Jordão, CEO of Sonae Distribuição3 
 
1. Introduction 
In mid-2007, news regarding Carrefour’s decision of selling its operations in Portugal 
disturbed the Portuguese retail sector. Despite the majority of the analysts considering the 
French Group Auchan as the most likely winner of this race, all doubts were cleared on July 
26th: Sonae Distribuição won the bidding, buying Carrefour’s Portuguese operations for an 
enterprise value of 662 million Euros. The deal incuded Carrefour’s 12 hypermarkets and 8 
petrol stations, as well as the 13 licenses for newcommercial spaces that the French group had 
already obtained. The deal excluded, however, the discount network Minipreço, also 
controlled by Carrefour. 
On December 27th the competition authority announced its decision of n t opposing to the 
deal, requiring however remedies in six markets identifi d as having a risk of dominant 
position creation or reinforcement (Viana do Castelo, Coimbra, Paços de Ferreira/Penafiel, 
Porto, Montijo/Barreiro/Seixal, and Portimão). These remedies included the elimination of 
32,000 sqm of sales area, 15,000 sqm in alienations o competitors and 17,000 sqm in sales 
area reduction (actual or licensed). The company was also barred from requesting licenses for 
expansions, modifications or new openings for one year in these markets. Although these 
restrictions amount to about 19% of the total acquired area, they are mainly concerned to the 
food segment, and could therefore be used by Sonae t  install its non-food brands.  
In the beginning of 2008, less than a month later, the acquisition process was concluded and 
the Carrefour banner was replaced by Continente (Sonae’s hypermarket brand). Nuno Jordão, 
CEO of Sonae Distribuição, pointed out: “In two days we changed the back-office and front-
office systems, reclassified 120 thousand products, registered all the suppliers. (…) It was 
amazing the way the integration of Carrefour’s 3 thousand employees in Sonae Distribuição 
was done”4, and adds, “everything was conducted smoothly and no problems arose the 
following days (…) and, in contrast with what typically happens, there was a sales increase 
instead of a decrease”.5  
                                                
2 Pedro Santos Guerreiro, “O ‘hat-trick’ de Jordão”, Jornal de Negócios 30 Jul. 07.  
3 Sonae Distribuição, Correio da Distribuição, nr. 106. 
4 Nuno Botelho, “Portugal fica saturado em 2010”, Público – Economia 8 Mar. 08. 
5 Sónia Peres Pinto, “Mudança de Carrefour para Contine te devia ser «case study»”, Agência Financeira 19 Feb. 08 
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With this deal, Sonae strengthened its position as the largest retailer in Portugal, with a market 
share of about 30% (statically), reinforcing its distance towards the 2nd player, Jerónimo 
Martins (19%), and obtaining the leadership in a new r gional market, Braga. The acquisition 
was seen as the first consolidation move of the Portuguese retail sector. 
The acquisition deal was associated to an enterpris value (EV)/Sales transaction multiple of 
1.25x6, which is considered by Millennium BCP’s Investment Bank analysts as higher than the 
typical multiple for retail players (Sonae Distribução was valued with an EV/Sales multiple of 
0.87x). Even so, these analysts, along with BPI’s Investment Bank analysts, considered that it 
was possible for Sonae to achieve the necessary synergies to make this a profitable deal if a 
0.4% increase in EBITDA margin was accomplished.7 
 
2. Retail Sector  
Retailing is usually the sector that generates higher sales volumes and employment in any 
economy, being valued at 5 billion dollars globally. The profitability of the sector depends on 
the population growth and consumer preferences. 
The introduction of new retail formats (supermarkets and hypermarkets) changed the way 
retailing is done and created a scale advantage for retailers at the expense of manufacturers 
(Exhibit 1). The increasing lack of differentiation between retailers made price the main 
competitive factor, shrinking the sector’s profit margins. As a result, retailers put an effort on 
obtaining high sales volume and operational efficien y to enhance profitability. Therefore, 
retailers have been using M&A as a way to enlarge their operating capability (to obtain 
synergistic cost savings and higher bargaining power, and reach the minimum scale required 
to compete at a global level) and to expand to foreign markets. To give an example, the Top 
10 global retail players account for almost 30% of the Top 250 players’ sales and in Europe 
the Top 30 players are expected to generate 71.5% of global sales in 2009.8 (Appendix 1) 
The consumers’ focus on price and their higher level of information created another trend in 
retailing: private labels. Labeled under the retailr brand, these products are usually cheaper 
due to lower costs with marketing, distribution and economies of scale in production. These 
products also represent an opportunity to differentiate from competitors and create a 
relationship with consumers. Since consumers link the retailer’s brand with the retailer’s own 
brand products, this represents an opportunity to enhance consumer loyalty and retailer brand 
                                                
6 Carrefour’s Enterprise Value = 662M€; Sales of Carrefour in 2006 = 530M€. Source: Millennium BCP, Newsletter 
de Investimentos, Nr. 54, 30 Jul. 07 
7 “Quatro razões por que a compra do Carrefour é positiva para a Sonae”, Jornal de Negócios 27 Jul. 07; Cátia 
Almeida, “Sonae espera converter Carrefour em Contine e ainda este ano”, Diário de Notícias 3 Aug. 07  
8 Luís Aragão, “Concentração marca retalho europeu”, Hipersuper 17 Mar. 06 
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image by taking advantage of the “umbrella effect” 9. Private labels also give retailers the 
power over every decision in the value chain, entirly controlling their final offers. 
Manufacturers are the ones who lose the most: in addition to the increase in retailers’ 
dimension and consequent bargaining power, they have to compete with private labels and 
deal with the reduction in the number of suppliers and branded products bought by retailers. 
This fact has further intensified the competition at producers’ level and explains why many 
suppliers decided to produce retailers’ private labe s.  
 
2.1. The Portuguese Case 
Unlike what usually happens in other countries where at least one of the global Top 30 
retailers is the market leader, the Portuguese retail sector is led by two national chains (Sonae 
Distribuição and Jerónimo Martins) (Exhibit 2). In 2006, Sonae Distribuição was the market 
leader (3,526M€), followed by Jerónimo Martins (1,948M€) and Intermarché (1,654M€10). 
Minipreço and Pingo Doce were the players with the highest number of stores and Modelo led 
in sales area (Exhibit 3). With a business volume of approximately 14,127 million Euros11, 
retailing is a very dynamic sector, especially the food segment with an annual growth rate of 
4.1% in revenues and 6% in sales area. (Appendix 2) 
Evolution of retail formats – following the modernization path 
With the introduction of the first hypermarkets in Portugal in the late 80s, the Portuguese retail 
sector suffered a change in its structure. During the 90s, traditional retailers lost their 
dominance to supermarkets and mostly to hypermarkets, whose market share increased from 
5.4% in 1987 to 42.4% in 1995.12 (Appendix 3)  
After the year 2000 the dominance of hypermarkets started to slow down. The low economic 
growth, high level of families’ debt and unemployment prompted a contraction in private 
consumption (Appendix 4). As a consequence, consumers’ b havior changed: in-house food 
consumption increased (especially fresh products) while clothing, fuel, household and out-of-
home food consumption decreased, and consumers became more price-oriented. These 
changes created a gap in the market that was soon seized by discount chains (Appendix 5). 
The success and expansion of this format led many players to rethink their strategies, offering 
private labels, creating discount chains or adopting an every-day-low-price strategy. To 
provide an example, Jerónimo Martins completely changed the positioning statement of Pingo 
Doce from a high-end target to a soft discount chain, based on location proximity and focused 
                                                
9 Consumers accept new products just because they have t e same brand. Consumers are willing to try new 
products since they remember good previous experiences with products with the same brand. 
10 José António Rousseau, Manual de Distribuição, 2008. 
11 2007 INE data, considering both food and non-food retailers.  
12 Cátia Almeida, “Hipers perdem negócio para supermercados”, Diário de Noticias 19 Jul. 06 
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on fresh products and private labels. This repositioning increased even further the pressure on 
low prices across the market. 
The new commercial licensing law approved in 2004 contributed to the slackening of the 
restrictions in the attribution of new commercial space licenses (blocked since 2001). Still, the 
benefits were not extended in a large measure to hypermarkets. This was due to the pressures 
made by traditional retailers to limit the expansio of large dimension formats, and also due to 
the difficulty in establishing larger formats in markets with significantly high installed sales 
area. Furthermore, stores with more than 2,000 sqm were required to close on Sundays and 
holidays in the afternoons, which negatively affected their revenues. 
As a result of these restrictions and changes in consumers’ preferences for proximity, smaller 
formats (supermarkets and discounts) have been benefiting from a higher expansion pace. As 
José Silva Ferreira, former president of APED13, states: “People are going back to proximity 
supermarkets and focusing their shopping on food. They are coming back to the essential, 
which limits the introduction of larger stores”.14 (Exhibit 4)  
Despite this apparent unfavorable forecast for hypermarkets, the level of hypermarket 
penetration in Portugal is still low (150,000 people er hypermarket) when compared with 
Spain (110,000) or France (50,000).15 (Exhibit 5) Therefore, unexplored opportunities might 
still be available in the market for this format. 
Private Label – a new opportunity 
Following the global trend, private labels have also been gaining market share in Portugal. 
Despite presenting a low volume when compared to the European average, these products 
have registered a considerable increase in sales (12.9% in 2005 to 20.05% in 2007). (Appendix 
6) The association of low prices to low quality seems to have been overcome as well as the 
idea that private labels are cheap imitations of branded products.  
Retailers have been including private labels in their portfolio as strategic pillars, in order to 
control the value chain, increase their bargaining power over suppliers and obtain higher profit 
margins. In fact, private labels’ growing acceptance has allowed retailers to increasing the 
final price, twice more than branded products. 16 To reinforce their brand, retailers offer a large 
range of private labels, divided in several price categories, from premier-prix products to 
products with similar quality to branded ones but at lower prices, or even gourmet products. 
Moreover, they entered unexplored niches and are starting to surpass branded products in 
terms of innovation.  
                                                
13 APED - Portuguese Association of Retail Companies 
14 Lúcia Crespo, “Entrevista distribuidores vs. produt res”, Jornal de Negócios 25 Nov. 08 
15 Luís Aragão, “O poder do discount”. Hipersuper 10 Jan. 06 
16 “Supermercados aumentam preço dos produtos brancos”, Diário de Notícias, 8 Dec. 08 
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Diversification trend: non-food retailing 
The number of non-food retail chains (category killers) has also grown over the last few years 
(23% of the sector in 2006 vs. 20% in 2004), offering a high diversity of products in a single 
category at low prices (e.g., apparel, electronics, toys, sports goods, etc.). Despite many 
players being specialized in a given non-food retail segment, some of them are also big food-
retail players. Actually, according to APED, non-food retailing is led by Sonae Distribuição, 
with Worten on the lead with 478 million Euros in sales in 2008.  
The fast growth of these formats may be explained by several factors. First, the food-retailing 
market is nearing saturation, especially in big cities, so its profitability and growth are likely to 
slow down in the following years. Hence, non-food retailing appears to be the solution for 
retailers’ sustainable growth in the long-run, diversification of their risk and capitalization of 
their consumer base to other stores of the group. Second, commercial licensing law is not as 
strict as in food retailing, with the expansion of category killers being easier to obtain than in 
food retailing. Third, category killers present high levels of profit potential. To give an 
example, these formats led 2006 and 2007 APED profitability rankings (Appendix 7). 
Growth and concentration 
Competition in retailing is expected to intensify in the following years, with the supply 
surpassing the demand level even further. Average stor density, despite being already high is 
still below the European mean, which predicts a continuous growth. The level of retailers’ 
concentration is also still low when compared with ot er European markets (Exhibit 6). A 
study conducted by Roland Berger highlights the fact that in the majority of product categories 
there is a higher level of producers’ concentration han retailers’.17 Despite this, the growing 
number of players and stores has intensified competition, and the success of some players 
occasionally leads to the acquisition of others. M&A represent the easiest way to grow, 
especially concerning hypermarkets, whose growth is limited by stricter legal constraints and 
already represent a mature market (usually characterized by lower growth rates). 
 
3. Companies Profile 
3.1. Carrefour 
Founded in France in 1960, Carrefour is the largest retail chain in the world in terms of size 
and the second largest retailer in revenues, with annu l sales of approximately 102 billion 
Euros in 2007. Its operations are located mainly in Europe, Latin America and Asia, with over 
15,000 stores located in a total of 30 countries. Carrefour was the first one to create the 
                                                
17 “A evolução da concentração da indústria e da distribuição em Portugal”. Roland Berger’s study for APED. 16 
Mar. 09 <http://www.aped.pt/pdf/APED_Conferencia_Imprensa.pdf> 
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concept of hypermarkets: “the concept was entirely new – ‘everything under one roof’ in a 
self-service environment – and it was an overwhelming success with customers.”18  
To overcome the restrictions in new hypermarket openings in France, Carrefour soon started 
to expand its operations abroad, organically and through M&A. The main expansion move 
took place in 2000, with the merger with Promodés (another French retailer), which converted 
the company into a heavy global player. 
Despite being global, Carrefour acts mainly locally, adapting its stores and products to the 
different markets and locations. Around 90% of the products on shelves come from national 
suppliers. Products are only bought through the central purchasing unit when it is more 
profitable than buying locally. Carrefour also uses a decentralized structure to better adapt and 
react to opportunities and threats in each location. Each store is free to undertake decisions 
regarding product-mix, purchases, positioning, and objectives achievement. Headquarters are 
mainly responsible for long-term strategy decisions a d global financial and technical issues. 
The French group entered Portugal in 1991, through the acquisition of two Euromarché 
hypermarkets. In 2007, Carrefour was operating in Portugal under 2 banners: Carrefour–
Portugal (hypermarkets) and Minipreço (discount chain). Exhibit 7 illustrates the situation of 
Carrefour–Portugal before the deal. It was an important player, with stores in key locations. 
The retailer was seen by consumers as having a high variety of products and brands, good 
quality fresh products, and an aggressive pricing policy in some categories (Exhibit 8). It 
offered different products from competitors, namely private labels and gourmet products.  
The divestment decision arose as a consequence of th rationalization strategy implemented in 
2005 by the new CEO José Luis Durán, in response to the disclosure of poor financial results. 
To achieve the objective of annual sales growth of 6-8% and increase profits, Carrefour 
decided to invest only in the most profitable countries, where the group has a dominant 
position, and dispose of non-strategic or underperforming markets where the objective of 
being an industry leader was unattainable. The company’s priorities are therefore (1) France, 
(2) Spain, Belgium and Italy (Carrefour’s ‘G4’ countries), and (3) the emerging countries, 
mainly BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). 
Despite the increasing financial results, Portugal did not represent a strategic market for 
Carrefour (about 0.6% of total net sales).19 Still, the main reason behind the divestment 
decision was the position of Carrefour–Portugal in the retail market ranking (7th). The fierce 
competition, changes in consumers’ preferences towards smaller and proximity formats and 
the legal restrictions to hypermarket operations made the achievement of a leading position 
unattainable, prompting the divestment decision. 
 
                                                
18 “At a Glance 2007”, <http://www.carrefour.com> 
19 Raquel Almeida Correia, “Retalho – Porque é que o Carrefour se vai embora”, Público–Economia 27 Jul. 07 
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3.2. Sonae Distribuição 
Sonae Distribuição is the retail branch of Sonae, on  f the largest Portuguese private groups. 
Founded in 1985 as the result of a joint-venture betwe n Sonae and Promodés, Sonae 
Distribuição was the first company to introduce the hypermarket concept in Portugal, changing 
the way retailing was done in the country and the Portuguese consumption habits. It was an 
unknown reality in Portugal at the time, and the strategic alliance provided an opportunity for 
Sonae to obtain know-how from Promodés (the 2nd largest retailer at the time) in terms of 
sector knowledge and its experience in the already developed French market, namely 
competences on sales management and information systems. The alliance allowed Sonae to 
benefit from its large scale and create a strong brand in hypermarkets – Continente. 
The following years were marked by the expansion, diversification and improvement of 
Sonae’s operations. The company expanded its portfoli , introducing smaller and non-food 
formats. The need to grow also prompted the company to expand the food segment to Brazil in 
1995, an investment that was withdrawn by the company ten years later due to “difficulties in 
presenting higher profit levels than the cost of capital invested in this market”.20 
When Carrefour merged with Promodés in 1998, Sonae Distribuição found itself in an 
uncomfortable situation, with Carrefour owning 22.37% of its equity and at the same time 
being an important competitor. This situation dragged on until 2004, when Sonae bought 
Carrefour’s rights to the company and took the stocks of the company out of the stock market 
to avoid similar situations in the future.  
In 2007, Sonae Distribuição was the number one player in both food and non-food retailing, 
generating annual sales of 3.4 billion Euros and covering 70% of the Portuguese population. 
(Exhibit 9 summarizes Sonae Distribuição’s situation before the deal). At the time, food 
retailing represented about 70% of its revenues and its food brands led the ranking of brand 
strength in retailing done by Marktest (Appendix 9). Continente, its main brand, had been 
considered the retailer in which Portuguese people place the most confidence since 2003. 
 
4. Sonae’s Way 
“I want unthinkable investment plans.” - Paulo Azevedo, CEO of Sonae SGPS21 
“Numbers illustrate the profile of Sonae Distribuição, i.e., a company designed to grow!”- Nuno Jordão22 
From the beginning, Sonae Distribuição relied on three main strategic pillars:  
- Growth:  In a constant effort to reinforce its leadership position in the Portuguese retail 
sector, Sonae Distribuição tried to exploit all growth opportunities, either organically or 
                                                
20 Sonae SGPS report to CMVM. <http://www.agenciafinanceira.iol.pt/noticia.php?id=622304&main_id=> 
21 Victor Jorge, “Afinal alguém quis o Carrefour”, Hipersuper 27 Aug. 07 
22 Sonae Distribuição, op. cit., p. 4. 
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through M&A. Therefore, the company has been registring a growth in the opening of new 
stores and sales area. Besides, the company analyzes the xisting opportunities to implement 
new business concepts that can boost its growth objectives. The main basic concept of the 
company’s growth plans is the attainment of synergistic gains from resources and internal 
competences, namely economies of scale and scope (in management, logistics and 
information systems for instance), market know-how and channeling their consumer base to 
new stores. Additionally, expansion to new regional markets and foreign markets is 
considered whenever the return on investment is expected to be positive. 
- Efficiency: To obtain higher operational margins, Sonae Distribuição puts a lot of effort on 
constantly enhancing its business efficiency. Operation l efficiency programs in areas such 
as infrastructure logistics, information systems, inventory management optimization and 
store operations are frequently implemented, with the objective of achieving more effective 
cost controls and productivity gains. Employees also receive training in areas such as 
operational service, customer knowledge, and technical competencies to enhance this 
efficiency. On the other hand, Sonae Distribuição’s centralized structure and logistics also 
represent a source of efficiency gains. Since the company operates mainly in Portugal, the 
market dimension and considerable homogeneity allows the company to rely on central 
warehouses and central purchasing units, and to centralize its decision-making procedures in 
the headquarters. 
- Innovation: The company tries to create a competitive advantage based on innovative 
solutions, transversely applied to every brand and to every store. The client is the starting 
point of every new solution and the company tries to anticipate its consumers’ expectations, 
without forgetting their efficiency concerns. To enha ce innovation, Sonae Distribuição 
relies on programs that stimulate stakeholders to develop new ideas that can improve the 
company. Over the last years, the company developed new business formats and innovative 
private label products for each format. Logistics (e.g., voice-picking system), management 
models (e.g., category management), services (e.g., online store, insurance), store spaces 
(e.g., gourmet area) and customer relationship programs (e.g. self-checkouts, loyalty card) 
are also areas where innovation has been a constant.  
4.1. Code Name: Growth 
While paying attention to organic growth, both Paulo Azevedo (CEO of Sonae SGPS) and 
Nuno Jordão (CEO of Sonae Distribuição) believe that e Portuguese retail sector is in a 
consolidation phase and that the company’s future expansion relies on acquisitions in any 
retail format to overcome the legal constraints of new openings and smooth competition.  
Referring to the food segment, Nuno Jordão remarks that “by the end of the decade we can say 
that the Portuguese market will be saturated. That is why we decided to focus our investment 
Acquisition of Carrefour-Portugal by Sonae Distribuição 
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efforts in Portugal”.23 This means that the opportunities to dominate the Portuguese market 
will vanish until the end of the decade, being all acquisitions with a value creation potential 
‘now-or-never-opportunities’ to grow. Non-food segments’ expansion is also included in the 
company’s investment plans, with the opening of nearly 100 stores between 2006 and 2007 
and the internationalization of some brands to Spain.24  
Portugal still presents a lower level of retailing concentration than the EU average, which 
represents an opportunity for Sonae Distribuição to expand its sales base in its home country 
and avoid a reinforcement of the competitors’ positi n. Thus, the company is “aware of 
possible acquisition opportunities that might allow for the reinforcement of its business 
competitive positions”.25 
 
5. The Acquisition 
“The decision of doing this investment is based on the attractiveness of the assets, quality and 
competence of Carrefour-Portugal’s human resources and on the certainty that, in a highly attractive and 
dynamic market such as the Portuguese retail distribution sector, Sonae Distribuição will be in a better 
position to enhance Portuguese consumers’ satisfaction levels, both in terms of aggressive pricing 
policies and variety and quality of the products and services offered”.  
Nuno Jordão, CEO of Sonae Distribuição, during the Carrefour acquisition press conference26 
In July 2007, and after some negotiation rounds, Sonae Distribuição reached a deal with 
Carrefour for the acquisition of its Portuguese operations for a value of 662M Euros, adding to 
its food operations portfolio of 105 Modelo stores (187,000 sqm) and 19 Continente stores 
(162,000 sqm), the 83,000 sqm of Carrefour. 
For Sonae Distribuição, the acquisition of Carrefour–Portugal was carried out for several 
reasons. First, there was the fit between Carrefour’s and Sonae’s store portfolio. The deal only 
included hypermarkets, which were similar to C ntinente stores, revealing a high operational 
similarity and complementing its product portfolio. Second, the acquisition represented an 
opportunity for Sonae to reinforce its market leadership in the food segment. Sonae 
Distribuição was the leader with a 25% market share, followed closely by Jerónimo Martins 
with 19% (which could easily represent a threat to Sonae’s position in the case their acquired 
Carrefour’s operations). With this acquisition, Sonae Distribuição would also prevent the 
entrance of new foreign players that might be interested in entering Portugal. Third, 
Carrefour–Portugal was present in some important regional markets where Sonae had not 
managed to enter due to legal restrictions (namely Braga and Aveiro), representing the 
opportunity for the enlargement of its market coverag . Fourth, Carrefour’s operations would 
                                                
23 Nuno Botelho, op. cit., p. 4. 
24 In mid-2008 the company entered in the Spanish market with SportZone and Worten. 
25 Victor Jorge, “Sonae Distribuição atinge 3,4 mil mhões”, Hipersuper 21 Mar. 08 
26 “Sonae compra Carrefour em Portugal por 662 milhões”, Agência Financeira 27 Jul 07 
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reinforce Sonae’s growth due to the additional store space offered and also by adding to 
Sonae’s portfolio licenses for new commercial spaces, ontributing to the organic growth of 
the company. Fifth, there were many cost saving opportunities that could be achieved by 
integrating the operations and headquarters’ functio s of the companies.  
The integration started to be planned in August, long before the competition authority’s 
approval, in order to minimize the risk of failure. To ease the integration and build a stronger 
company, a multidisciplinary team with elements from both companies was created. The main 
objective was to guarantee that the integration of operations and stores was done in a quick 
and smooth way. Moreover, there was a special concern with effectively communicating all 
the decisions and implications of the deal to stakeholders, to prevent their resistance.  
It was predictable from the beginning that the acquisition would result in a total integration of 
Carrefour’s operations into Sonae Distribuição’s structure, in order to exploit the potential 
synergistic gains that would result from their similarities and complementarities, and in the 
replacement of the Carrefour banner for Continente’s. Therefore, after the merger, each of the 
Carrefour stores was completely integrated in Sonae’s store portfolio, adopting the same 
organization procedures and processes and losing a significant part of their previous decision-
making power. From this point on, headquarters will make all the decisions regarding product 
portfolio and administrative functions, all orders are to be done through the central purchasing 
unit instead of directly to suppliers, deliveries are not to be done directly to the store but to 
central warehouses (where products are to remain in stock until they are needed in a store) and 
suppliers are common to all stores. This change allowed for a reduction of in-store storage 
space and consequently the conversion of that space in sales area. Hence, this space has been 
used to open new non-food stores, namely Worten, SportZone and Modalfa stores. Regarding 
administrative functions, Carrefour’s large store-level structure (which included control and 
purchasing functions for instance) was replaced by Sonae’s structure and Carrefour’s 
employees were integrated into the existing departmen s at Sonae Distribuição’s headquarters. 
As far as commercial aspects are concerned, a product portfolio analysis of both companies 
was conducted, in order to identify the non-coincident product ranges and create a stronger 
portfolio. Carrefour was known for its exclusive products, namely gourmet and specialized 
products, and for good fresh products. Sonae Distribuição tried to incorporate into its portfolio 
those exclusive categories and replace the fresh products suppliers whenever Carrefour’s ones 
offered higher quality products (e.g. meat). Carrefour also had a significant percentage of 
private labels on its product offerings, products that Sonae Distribuição also tried to 
incorporate whenever they were not in the portfolio. It is important to note that Carrefour-
Portugal was integrated within a global retail chain, with a larger capacity to produce private 
labels than Sonae Distribuição, making it impossible for Sonae to incorporate all the private 
label suppliers. As a consequence of the deal, 10,000 new references were introduced. Miguel 
Rangel, Marketing Director of Continente, remarks: “It was a win-win process, not only in 
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terms of integration but also of information and the scope that Carrefour had in its private-
label. Not wanting to fail to our clients’ expectations and deprive them from some products 
that Carrefour offered, we enlarged the assortment to include what Continente’s private label 
was not offering until now”.27  
During the merger, Sonae did not have to lay people ff. One reason for that was the normal 
staff turnover rate, which could now be fulfilled with Carrefour’s employees. On the other 
hand, Sonae Distribuição has predicted to create 2,000 to 3,000 jobs per year after the 
acquisition, preventing the need to lay off people. Some of the main top functions of 
Carrefour-Portugal were located in Spain (the regional headquarter), remaining a part of 
Carrefour after the deal. The duplicated functions were gradually eliminated and employees 
were allocated to their original departments (if possible) or to departments with growth needs. 
Nuno Jordão went to Carrefour-Portugal’s offices himself to communicate the decision of 
maintaining all employees and to clarify people about their future tasks and positions within 
the new company. Meritocracy was the decision criteria for choosing who remained in the 
functions and who was transferred, in order to create a company that combines the best talents. 
Customers also received special attention. According to Nuno Jordão: “We have clients in the 
center of our agenda. (…) From the first day, we will reinforce the levels of store service, 
especially in checkouts and service sections. In order to do that, we hired 575 new employees 
to make it easier for the client to see the improvement. (…) We created for each of the 12 
stores a fortnightly brochure. In this brochure we ar going to explain what we are doing, what 
is changing in the store and create, at the same ti, mechanisms to allow the client to take 
part in our continuous improvement program”.28 
Carrefour’s information systems as well as their financial and control instruments also had to 
be adjusted to the way these mechanisms worked at Sonae. To guarantee a successful 
adjustment, training was offered to the new employees and to Sonae’s pre-acquisition 
employees (to help the integration of the new ones). Despite having adopted mainly Sonae’s 
procedures, some Carrefour’s policies were incorporated and new practices were adopted. To 
give an example, the key performance indicators were changed to accommodate the new 
company reality and part of the incentive system from Carrefour was adopted. 
Faced with the smooth and fast way the integration was done, Nuno Jordão pointed out: “this 
process should be considered a case-study”29, and added “today we are a single company with 
everyone doing their best to give to our wide customer base additional reasons for 
satisfaction”.30 
                                                
27 Victor Jorge, “O Consumidor confia cada vez mais nmarcas próprias” Hipersuper 16 May 08 
28 Sonae Distribuição, op. cit., p. 4. 
29 Sónia Peres Pinto, op. cit., p. 4. 
30 Sonae Distribuição, op. cit., p. 4. 
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PART I I  – CASE ANALYSIS 
This section is dedicated to the analysis of the case described in the previous section and tries 
to draw some conclusions from the data presented in the case description. The analysis will 
always have as basis the recent literature on M&A. Firstly, an analysis on the potential value 
creation of this acquisition is presented. Then, the strategic fit of the acquisition on the strategy 
of the acquirer is discussed. After that, the analysis follows on the post-acquisition integration 
process, in order to understand its contribution to potential value realization. To conclude, a 
brief summary of the rationale behind the deal is presented and discussed. 
 
1. Synergies 
Value creation is the basis of any firm’s strategy (Besanko, et al., 2007). M&A are then used 
by companies with the same underlying purpose: to create value for stakeholders, i.e., 
synergies are the motive behind a company’s decision to merge or acquire other companies. 
One can say that a synergy exists when the new firm’s value is higher than the sum of the 
values of the two previous firms acting independently (e.g., Capron, 1999). Typically, the 
literature on the subjects identifies as main sources of synergies the improvement of operating 
efficiencies through economies of scale and scope, and the exchange of knowledge, 
capabilities and resources (e.g., Hitt, Ireland and Harrison, 2008; Capron, 1999). The 
acquisition of Carrefour-Portugal presents several opportunities to create value. 
First of all, the acquisition represents an opportunity to expand Sonae Distribuição’s market 
coverage and consequently sales and market share. This represents a crucial aspect in a sector 
where expansion is restricted by law. Market expansion is a central issue for any retailer to 
face the increasing price competition that characteizes the sector. To cope with diminutive 
margins, large sales volumes are the solution for survival. Moreover, the legal restrictions to 
growth limit the number of good locations (in terms of proximity, number of potential 
consumers, average consumer’s income, etc.) where retailers can open stores. Therefore, this 
acquisition offers Sonae the possibility to integrate in the portfolio new privileged located 
stores that otherwise the company would hardly obtain. 
The dimension increase that results from the acquisition also positively affects the bargaining 
power relative to suppliers of the company. With a m rket share of about 30% and the 
dominance of the hypermarket sector and some regional markets, it becomes even more 
important for suppliers to put their products in the shelves of this retail chain, being easier for 
Sonae to obtain better prices, payment conditions, fees, etc. This represents a central source of 
value creation, allowing the new company to increase it  profit margins or to be better 
prepared than competitors to face a fierce price competition without damaging its profitability. 
Following the same underlying logic, better credit conditions with financial institutions can be 
obtained, a crucial factor for a company that is involved in a substantial growth plan. 
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The reconfiguration of its product-mix also represent  a potential synergy, as pointed out by 
several authors (e.g., Kim and Finkelstein, 2009; Dranove and Shanley, 1995). The acquisition 
enables Sonae Distribuição to create a stronger portfoli  in terms of variety and quality. This 
represents a kind of “cross-selling” effect, with Carrefour’s exclusive products integrating 
Sonae’s large store chain and having a wider distribution area. Moreover, the offering 
reinforcement usually has a positive impact on corporate image and reputation, which might 
lead to a larger consumer base than the sum of the two companies’ consumers before the deal. 
Another opportunity for potential value creation is related to the efficiency gains that can be 
obtained through economies of scale and scope. These gains also result from the scale 
enlargement, being the results even more visible in the ex-Carrefour operations as a result of 
the change in its structure. In logistics, it is possible to obtain saving on purchases, 
transportation and inventory management as a result of the higher turnover. Under the new 
organization, the former Carrefour stores will be less vulnerable to order volumes and 
suppliers deliveries, requiring lower levels of in-store inventory and having lower costs. As for 
marketing, the new firm will be able to save on advertising investments and on duplicated 
customer relationship programs. With about the same resources as before, Sonae can now 
obtain a larger advertisement reach. Human resources also represent an important area of cost 
cutting with the elimination of duplicated functions. This is even more noteworthy considering 
the decentralized structure on which Carrefour was based on, with several functions at a store-
level that Sonae already centralized in headquarters. Those functions could, thus, be 
eliminated without requiring a significant increase of job positions in the headquarters. 
Finally, in all business areas, knowledge synergies might come up with the sharing of 
knowledge and capabilities. One of the reasons behind the acquisition was precisely the 
quality of Carrefour’s capabilities. As Nuno Jordão refers, “what is going to occur in this new 
company is a superior level of knowledge deriving from the new team”. To give an example, it 
will be possible to integrate both companies’ consumer database information, combining their 
market know-how and consumers insights, which represents a competitive advantage, 
especially considering Sonae’s focus on innovation in private label and customer relationship.  
In conclusion, Sonae Distribuição expects synergistic gains between 190 and 260 million 
Euros31, as a result of economies of scale and scope and resources exchange, which 
corresponds to an operational cash flow increase of 0.5% in three years. 
 
2. Strategic Fit 
“We have the opportunity to combine distinct knowledge that exists in each team, allowing the new team 
to reach a superior level of know-how, a crucial aspect to consolidate the leadership position in the 
Portuguese market” – Nuno Jordão, CEO of Sonae Distribuição. 
                                                
31 Paulo Moutinho, “Compra do Carrefour pode adicionar 9  14 cêntimos às acções da Sonae SGPS”, Jornal de 
Negócios 31 Jul. 07 
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When analyzing the potential value created by an acquisition, one important concept must be 
kept in mind: strategic fit. Jemison and Sitkin (1986) define strategic fit as “the degree to 
which the target firm augments or complements the parent’s strategy and thus makes 
identifiable contributions to the financial and nonfinancial goals of the parent” (p.146). 
Despite being related to synergy achievement (analyzed in the previous section), this concept 
of complementarity is highlighted in the literature as crucial to the success of M&A (e.g. 
Harrison et al., 2001; Hitt, Ireland and Harrison, 2008).  
Prior research (e.g., Grant, 1988; Lubatkin, 1987) has focused on firms’ similarities as the 
basis for value creation, based on economies of scale and similar competencies. However, 
recent studies (e.g., Hitt, Ireland and Harrison, 2008; Kim and Finkelstein, 2009; Harrison et 
al., 2001) defend that the existence of potential synergistic gains from similarities is not 
enough to guarantee the success of an acquisition. Superior value is created when firms have 
complementary resources because firms can combine their strengths in different areas, 
overcoming their vulnerabilities and shortage of resources, which results in a superior 
competitive advantage. In line with the resource-based view of the firm (e.g., Peteraf, 1993; 
St. John and Harrison, 1999), these authors highlight that the integration of complementary 
resources is more difficult to replicate by competitors, and thus, to compete against it, since it 
results in a unique combination of resources, and thus in private synergies. Private synergies 
are, therefore, defined in the literature as existing when “it is possible for two firms to 
combine their complementary resources in a way that creates more value that would any other 
combination of their resources” (Harrison et al., 2001, p. 394). 
Given the emphasis that literature gives to this subject, it seems quite important to understand 
the reason why the acquisition of Carrefour-Portugal fits within the strategy of Sonae, namely 
by analyzing how this acquisition complements Sonae’s strategy, enabling it to create superior 
value. Despite some of the synergies identified in the previous section could have been 
achieved by other retailer who had bought Carrefour-Portugal, some of them could probably 
only be achieved by Sonae as a result of the complementary of resources between the firms. 
First, in terms of geographical coverage, Carrefour’s operations fill in important gaps in Sonae 
Distribuição’s store portfolio that the company was not able to overcome alone due to legal 
constraints (namely Aveiro and Braga). One can say th t the remedies imposed by the 
competition authority might indicate that the level of complementarity is limited. However, 
operating in a large range of retail concepts, Sonae w s better-positioned to overcome the 
restrictions imposed on food sales area expansion than any other retailer (with limited business 
portfolios), by converting some food stores into non-f od stores. Therefore, the acquisition 
fulfills Sonae’s growth needs in the food segment and boosts the expansion of non-food stores.  
On the other hand, Carrefour’s exclusive products complement the already vast portfolio of 
Sonae. The gourmet and the high quality fresh products fit perfectly with the aspirations of 
Sonae to create a wider and stronger product portfoli , overcoming the existing flaws on those 
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categories. Moreover, for Sonae, its private label was a ‘must-invest’ area: it could reinforce 
the image of Continente as a reliable and innovative brand, and offer advantages in terms of 
bargaining power and profit margins. Before the deal, the company was already considering 
the increase in weight of private label. Again, this acquisition matches Sonae’s aspirations of 
creating a strong private label offering, integrating in the company not only their supplier 
network but also the embedded knowledge that Carrefou  already had in this field.  
As far as cost reduction is concerned, the dimension of Sonae Distribuição combined with 
Carrefour-Portugal creates a unique competitive advantage in terms of market leadership 
position. Therefore, the gains associated with economies of scale and bargaining power are 
potentially higher since the company now largely dominates the hypermarket sector in 
Portugal and is far ahead of its competitors in terms of market share. 
In conclusion, and despite the analysts’ prediction that Carrefour-Portugal and Sonae 
Distribuição might not be a good fit (or at least not as high as between Carrefour and other 
retailer, such as Auchan), the identified synergies illu trate the opposite. The triumph of Sonae 
in the acquisition bidding process may induce that the company already expected the 
realization of higher synergies than its rivals befor hand, in line with Barney’s (1988) 
arguments. In fact, for Sonae this acquisition was considered crucial to consolidate its market 
leadership and all efforts were made to win the bidding process with a very competitive offer. 
 
3. Integration Aspects 
“Many acquisitions fail because aspects concerning people are disregarded.” – Nuno Jordão.32 
For potential synergistic gains to be converted into real value, some changes are necessary to 
make for the two companies work as a unit. As pointed out by several authors, strategic fit is 
not enough and the integration process is a crucial aspect on determining the success of an 
acquisition (e.g., Hitt, Ireland and Harrison, 2008; Cartwright, 2005; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991). Zollo and Singh (2004) define the integration process as a process “focused on 
extracting the gains associated with the combinatio of the two organizations” (p. 1235),  
Pablo (1994) adds: “[It is the] making of changes in the functional activity arrangements, 
organizational structures and systems, and cultures of combining organizations to facilitate 
their consolidation into a functioning whole” (p. 806). 
As previously described, Sonae Distribuição took several measures to make this acquisition a 
successful deal. The dominant organizational integration strategy was to convert two 
companies into a single one, in order to take advantage of the synergies identified. Despite 
involving higher costs and risks, a high level of integration allows for a more effective 
realization of potential value (e.g., Zollo and Singh, 2004; Capron, 1999). An effective 
knowledge transfer requires the integration and interaction of the firms (e.g., Larsson and 
                                                
32 Sonae Distribuição, op. cit., p. 4. 
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Finkelstein, 1999; Ranft and Lord, 2002). When the acquired company is more autonomous, 
their interaction are more limited and, consequently, embedded knowledge will hardly be 
transferred between companies, jeopardizing some syn rg  creation.  
The successful and quick integration process, with the conversion of Carrefour’s stores into 
Continente in a few days, deserves a deeper look. Sonae Distribuição’s efforts to make 
everything run properly represent a set of best practices that should be considered. Moreover, 
when analyzing the possibility of acquiring Carrefour-Portugal, Sonae Distribuição already 
had in consideration the aspects that might favor a successful fit. 
This acquisition had some characteristics that predict  an easier integration process, being 
those characteristics in areas where usually problems arise and determine the failure of the 
acquisition: culture and operational fit. First, the companies belong to the same sector, which 
facilitates the knowledge transfer (e.g. King et al., 2006; Hitt, Harrison and Ireland, 2001). 
Managers did not have to learn how to deal with a new business, making the adaptation of 
operations of Carrefour-Portugal to Sonae Distribuição and the realization of potential 
synergies an easier process. Moreover, from a cultural perspective, significant shocks were not 
expected. The knowledge and know-how underlying Sonae Distribuição’s strategy came from 
the strategic alliance with Promodés. Therefore, th company shared with Carrefour the same 
French retail tradition and way of doing business.  
Schweiger and Walsh (1990) point out that effective human resource management is likely to 
be the key to M&A success during the post-acquisition integration process. Marks and Mirvis 
(2001) refer that acquisitions cause a great uncertainty to employees about their future career, 
which contributes to their resistance and has a negtive impact on productivity, absenteeism, 
turnover, job satisfaction and resistance to change, jeopardizing value creation. Taking a closer 
look at the integration process carried out by Sonae, it is possible to identify a great concern 
with issues related to the integration of people, namely through the stimulation of a 
cooperative environment and effective communication.  
The creation of a multidisciplinary team enhanced a cooperative environment between both 
companies. It minimized the problems arising after the acquisition by reducing employee 
resistance and smoothing the transfer of the embedded corporate knowledge, which makes the 
fit of systems and cultures and the synergy realization more likely to occur (e.g., McEvily and 
Marcus, 2005; Hitt, Ireland and Harrison, 2008). Despite having imposed a significant range 
of its policies, the cooperation that Sonae tried to induce between employees (e.g. employees 
received training to help the integration of Carrefour’s employees) and the adoption of some 
of Carrefour’s procedures smoothed the impact of the transition and minimized the inferiority 
feeling that the acquired firm employees usually feel ( .g., Hambrick and Cannella, 1993). 
Effective communication also explains the absence of employee resistance. By communicating 
all the decisions and changes to their employees, Sonae created a feeling of belonging and 
involvement in the corporate change they were undertaking, in line with the literature findings 
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(e.g., Cartwright, 2005; Hitt, Ireland and Harrison, 2008). By promptly informing that there 
would not be any lay-offs and explaining how the process would affect the employees’ 
careers, they contributed to increase the employees’ commitment to the success of the merger. 
A survey made after the integration process confirmed: people consider that the process was 
transparent; they were heard and felt well-integrated in the new company. As in every M&A, 
some people preferred to leave, but the meritocracy criteria adopted, the vast opportunities to 
integrate people in the company (or in other companies of the Sonae group) and the benefits 
program created good conditions to retain key-people and, thus, the embedded knowledge. 
It is also important to bear in mind the focus on consumer satisfaction. Some M&A fail 
because employees are more concerned with their future positions than serving their 
customers, and thus, it represents a good opportunity for competitors to gain market share. To 
what this case is concerned, Sonae offered additional training to sales force in order to prepare 
them to correctly inform customers of the implications of the acquisition and to create on them 
the idea that the newly formed company will be even b tter than the previous ones in quality, 
prices and variety. Nuno Jordão’s quote perfectly illustrates this concern: “We are aware that it 
is possible that some turbulence might occur during the first three or four weeks, which can 
result in the dissatisfaction of this or that client. Everything is going to be done to minimize 
those cases and to explain them to the client”.33 
The most significant difference between Carrefour and Sonae Distribuição was related to their 
structure and logistics. Being a global player, the decentralized structure of Carrefour has long 
been considered one of its main competitive advantages due to the fact that it allows the 
company to adapt to different market realities. On the other hand, Sonae Distribuição’s 
operations are mainly concentrated in Portugal, a sm ll and relatively homogeneous market, 
the reason why a centralized structure seems to be appropriate and allows the company to 
obtain high levels of efficiency. With the deal, Carrefour-Portugal is no longer part of a global 
chain, and thus the decentralized structure does not represent a significant competitive 
advantage. Therefore, its integration with Sonae Distribuição’s stores seems to be the best way 
to obtain the identified synergies with economies of cale and scope, elimination of duplicated 
functions, and enlargement of Sonae’s food and non-fo d concepts.  
It can be assumed that the similar business approaches made the integration and conciliation of 
procedures, systems and strategies easier. In fact, both relied on close relationship with 
customers, innovative offering, wide and diversified product-mix, and aggressive price 
positioning. Nuno Jordão points out, “[t]his process should be considered a case-study”34, and 
adds “[t]oday we are a single company with everyone doing their best to give to our wide 
customer base additional reasons for satisfaction”.35 
                                                
33 Sonae Distribuição, op. cit., p. 4. 
34 Sónia Peres Pinto, op. cit., p. 4. 
35 Sonae Distribuição, op. cit., p. 4. 
Acquisition of Carrefour-Portugal by Sonae Distribuição 
 21 
4. The Reasoning Behind the Merger  
Why was an acquisition a good strategic move? 
To better understand this acquisition, the sector’s background and competitive environment 
cannot be disregarded. Carrefour’s withdrawal represented the exit of an important player and, 
as a result, growth opportunities for the remaining players. Had Sonae not managed to buy 
Carrefour-Portugal, its leadership could have been threatened. Jerónimo Martins was in a good 
position to reach Sonae Distribuição’s position and even the other retailers could use the 
acquisition to expand their growth pace and threaten Sonae’s leadership in some markets.  
Behind this strategic decision was also the desire to gain even more scale. Sonae Distribuição 
is a firm “designed to grow”, but tied in a mature market with strict growth restrictions. In 
2006, Continente sales area only grew 3% (4,000 sqm), a low value wh n compared with 
smaller formats growth. The acquisition could easily represent a 17% increase in sales area 
and a 16% increase in turnover per year, approximately, which organically would be hardly 
achievable in a mature market. 
The increase in scale also represented an opportunity to enjoy larger profit margins by 
obtaining efficiency gains in economies of scale and scope and strengthening of its bargaining 
power towards suppliers. With the acquisition, Sonae guaranteed some ground between itself 
and its rivals, reaffirming itself as the number one retailer, turning into an important client for 
producers, and further reinforcing its competitiveness in international sourcing. In a market 
where consumers’ purchasing choices rely on prices, this increased capacity to guarantee good 
profit margins without increasing final prices reprsents an important competitive advantage. 
 
How does the acquisition of Carrefour-Portugal fit Sonae Distribuição’s strategy? 
Carrefour-Portugal represents an attractive target for Sonae due to its capacity to complement 
Sonae Distribuição’s flaws in terms of product and store portfolios.  
The integration of Carrefour’s operations offered the possibility of entering new regional 
markets and achieving leadership in some of them, which was not possible without the deal 
due to legal restrictions. It is important to bear in mind that the integration of Carrefour’s 
stores did not only result in the expansion of the food segment (where growth restrictions are 
stricter) but also in the non-food segment. Store restructuring under Sonae Distribuição’s 
space organization system made it possible to open new non-food stores in the same 
infrastructures, making a clear contribution to the growth of these concepts.  
On the other hand, the deal contributed to reinforce the commitment of Sonae with having a 
vast product offering. New product categories were included in Sonae’s product portfolio and 
some of the products were substituted for higher quality ones. The long tradition of Carrefour 
in private labels also brought benefits to Sonae. The Portuguese company was already aware 
of the importance and acceptance of these products by consumers and a program to reinforce 
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Continente’s private label was already in course before the deal. Now Sonae could benefit 
from Carrefour’s larger private label supplier network and from its know-how in this area.  
Despite being considered too small and non-strategic for Carrefour, Carrefour-Portugal was 
present in important locations, had a significant increase in sales area and registered good sales 
per store results. Its integration in Sonae could impulse the development of Carrefour-Portugal 
by being integrated in a larger Portuguese-based chain and augmenting the reach of its 
products. The good results that Carrefour was able to achieve even with a weaker brand and 
lower levels of consumers’ global satisfaction show that Sonae can learn with these new 
employees and incorporate some of the best practices us d by the global Carrefour chain. 
The perfect fit in terms of culture and organization reinforces the idea that Carrefour was the 
perfect target for the acquisition. The same French-experience background and similar 
strategic objectives allied with a highly organizatonal and operational fit made it possible to 
realize the expected synergies.  
It is therefore possible to conclude that the acquisition of Carrefour-Portugal fits Sonae 
Distribuição’s strategic pillars perfectly. First, it offers an immediate growth in terms of sales 
volume and sales area, and allows for the opening of ew non-food stores. Therefore, it makes 
it possible for Sonae to reinforce its position in the Portuguese market, obtaining a stronger 
cash-flow generation that can serve as basis for organic growth, diversification and 
internationalization. Second, the larger scale allows for superior gains in terms of efficiency, 
through economies of scale and enhancement of bargainin  power. Third, the integration of 
new knowledge and competences reinforces Sonae’s capability to constantly innovate, namely 
with new products, new practices, new ways of serving the client, etc. In fact, the acquisition 
impelled Sonae to allocate additional funds to investigation and product innovation.  
 
Results 
“In particularly adverse market conditions, Sonae Distribuição progressed over an already prominent 
leadership position in the Portuguese retail market, and safeguarded the demanding equilibrium between 
growth and operational profitability. […] In the current context, the results for 2008 hereby confirm the 
Company´s capacity to, sustainably, generate value for all its stakeholders. - Nuno Jordão.36 
Since Sonae Distribuição did not disclose specific quantitative results regarding the acquisition 
of Carrefour-Portugal, and it is not possible to islate the impact of the deal from other 
investments that Sonae carried out, it is not feasible to make an in-depth analysis of the impact 
of this deal on the company’s performance. Moreover, data regarding market shares is not 
available yet to analyze the impact on market share.  
According to Sonae Distribuição’s 2008 financial report, the main synergies were 
accomplished. The weaker operational margin values regi tered in the beginning of the year as 
                                                
36 Sonae Distribuição, 2008 Earnings Announcement – Consolidated Results, 18 Mar. 09 
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a consequence of the integration of Carrefour were overcome. In only one year, the company 
was able to improve efficiency in ex-Carrefour stores, surpassing the operational margin levels 
registered in the previous year in the food segment and maintaining the levels of total 
EBIDTA margin (excluding fuel) unchanged37. Thus the objective of having a balance 
between growth and operational profit was achieved.  
Despite 2008 having registered a decrease in private consumption (mainly affecting non-food 
segments), the total turnover of the company increased about 25% (20% without petrol 
stations). Considering that like-for-like sales only increased 1%, it seems possible to conclude 
that the integration of Carrefour stores had a significant contribution. The extended food and 
non-food sales area and the product-mix reinforcement (namely private labels, whose weight 
in total sales increased 2%) can be identified as the main reasons behind this growth. The 
impact is essentially evident in Continente sales, which increased 36% (being like-for-like 
sales increase of only 1%), against a growth of 2% registered in 2007. It seems important to 
note that besides the acquisition, the company continued its organic growth projects, which 
explain part of the financial results (consult Exhibit 10 for further information). 
In conclusion, only one year after the acquisition a d with a net profit still negatively 
influenced by the higher financial costs caused by the acquisition, the results point out to this 
being a successful deal. The required 0.5% increase in operational cash-flow during the first 
three years seems to be easily achievable, paying off the investment. The sales volume 
increase and operational margin improvement already registered substantiate this conclusion.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Creating and realizing synergies is a long process that does not end with the identification of 
potential synergies. Several aspects must be taken into account when an acquisition is being 
made, namely the strategic fit between the companies and the measures taken during the post-
acquisition integration process to convert potential synergies into real value. 
This case perfectly illustrates an acquisition made in the pursuit of growth and scale in a 
mature market, where growth rates are limited. These aspects are crucial in retailing given the 
specific characteristics of the market, based on low margins, large sales volumes and legal 
growth restrictions. The fact of being a mature market with too many players puts even more 
pressure on prices, shrinking profit margins. M&A were then expected to happen and this deal 
seems to represent the beginning of that process.  
This acquisition can be seen as the consolidation of Sonae Distribuição’s market leadership, 
with all the advantages embedded in that. The increased scale and market dominance created 
new opportunities for gains of efficiency, due to a higher turnover and reinforced bargaining 
power. Being a leader has also an impact on brand image and reputation, facilitating its 
                                                
37 The company also implemented efficiency enhancement programs, which explain part of the results. 
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penetration in the market, customer loyalty and the diffusion of Sonae’s own labeled products. 
More than contributing directly to Sonae’s growth, t e merger reinforced the base for future 
organic growth, adding new licenses to Sonae’s portfolio and new space where the company 
can establish new non-food business concepts. The additional value creation also boosts the 
necessary cash-flow base for internationalization in which the firm is nowadays involved.  
It is possible to identify strategic fit as one of the main reasons behind the creation of value. 
Sonae Distribuição and Carrefour-Portugal demonstrate a significant level of 
complementarity, namely in store and products portfolios and knowledge. Complementarities 
are the main source of sustainable synergies since they allow the creation of a unique 
combination of resources that rivals can hardly replicate or compete against. Therefore, Sonae 
Distribuição was able to create a stronger product portfolio, with more categories and higher 
quality products, namely its own private label. In terms of stores, the entrance in new regional 
markets and the access to new privileged locations was possible. The knowledge sharing is 
also crucial to create value in this acquisition by creating a stronger knowledge and know-how 
base, crucial to be a step ahead of competition in satisfying consumer preferences. 
In addition, this case study presents a range of best practices during the integration process. 
Human resources were identified as a key aspect that could not be disregarded. Thereby 
conflicts and uncertainty were prevented by focusing o  cooperation and communication. The 
company tried to involve every employee in the integration process, communicating all the 
decisions and the consequences for their future, in order to make them feel committed with the 
success of the process. Managers tried to unify from the beginning both company teams, to 
facilitate the transfer of embedded knowledge and establish the best policies to make the new 
company succeed. Efforts were made for the process to develop as quickly as possible, making 
the necessary changes to fully gather the synergistic gains, namely through structure 
reorganization and knowledge sharing. 
This case also demonstrates the positive impact on an i tegration process of having a similar 
culture and belonging to the same business segment. The common French-retailing 
background explains the similar cultures of Sonae Distribuição and Carrefour, determining 
their similar ways of facing retail business. Therefo , despite some differences that required 
adjustments, there was a substantial operational fit between these two companies, which made 
the integration process easier. Since significant changes are not necessary, cultural shocks and 
employee resistance were not expected. 
Even only after one year of post-acquisition operations, the analysis of this case indicates that 
this strategic move shows evidence of this having been a success case on creating value. 
Contrary to several analyst expectations, in the first year turnover registered a 25% increase, 
operational margins registered an improvement regardless of the integration of Carrefour 
stores and the introduction of new product references boosted sales. Therefore, this acquisition 
reinforced Sonae Distribuição’s position as the cash-cow of Sonae SGPS. 
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Exhibit 1 - Retail formats definition: 
 
- Traditional retailers: usually with small dimension, they charge higher prices than modern retailing to 
compensate the low quantity sold. 
- Supermarkets: with a store space between 400 sqm and 2,500 sqm, they offer food and household 
products organized into departments.  
- Hypermarkets: with a store space larger than 2,500 sqm, they combine under the same roof a 
supermarket and a department store.  
- Discounts: with small/medium dimension (400 to 1000 sqm), they present a lower number of SKUs 
(600 to 1000), usually selling mostly their private label products. The strategy is based on 
minimization of all costs that do not add value, in order to minimize prices (20 to 40% lower) and 
maximize sales. 
Source: adapted from Rousseau, 2008. 
 
Exhibit 2 – Portuguese retailing before the acquisition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source:  
 Sonae Distribuição 
 
 
2.1 – Retailers’ market shares in the food segment 
 
 
 
2.2 – Retailers positioning. Both Continente and Carrefour were focused on variety. Continente and Modelo 
belong to Sonae Distribuição, Feira Nova and Pingo Doce belong to Jerónimo Martins, and Jumbo belongs to 
Auchan. Intermarché’s brands are not represented in this analysis.  
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Exhibit 3 – APED rankings38 
-  Top 10 Sales Volume      -  Top 10 Sales Area  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Top 10 Number of Stores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: APED, Ranking 2006 
 
 
Exhibit 4 - Formats evolution: 2007-2008 
 
Source: TNS Worldpanel 2009 “O Consumidor e a Distribuição”. 12 Feb. 09 
 
4.1 – Hypermarkets are losing their dominance to supermarkets and discounts 
                                                
38 Rankings do not include Intermarché, since it only i tegrated APED in 2008. 
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Exhibit 5 – Concentration in the Portuguese Retail Sector  
 
 
 
5.1 – When compared with other European countries we can see that there is still growing opportunities 
for modern retailing, namely hypermarkets, supermarkets and discounts. 
 
 
 
Exhibit 6 – Concentration in the Portuguese retail sector 
 
 
 
6.1 – Portugal is below the European average regarding retailing concentration 
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Exhibit 7 – Carrefour-Portugal before the deal 
 
 
Source: Sonae Distribuição, APED 
 
7.1 – Carrefour was an important retailer, despite not being able to achieve a leading position 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: APED – Ranking 2005 and 2006 
 
7.2 –Carrefour was the number one retailer in sales volume/store in 2005 and the 6th in sales area growth in 2006. 
 
Exhibit 8 – Consumers’ satisfaction with retailers, March 2007 
 
 
Source: Marktest <http://www.marktest.com/wap/a/n/id~d57.aspx> 
8.1 – Carrefour was considered by consumers as having a vast diversity of products and brands and better 
quality in fresh products than Sonae Distribuição brands (Continente and Modelo). 
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Exhibit 9 – Sonae Distribuição before the deal* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sonae Distribuição 
 
 
*Note: SD’s portfolio is presented in Appendix 8. 
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Exhibit 10 – Sonae’s results after the deal* 
 
  Evolution of food formats EBITDA margin    L4L evolution of food formats 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sonae Distribuição 
 
10.1 – Despite the initial negative impact of the acquisition on the operational margin, the company was able 
to improve in the first year. The evolution of like-for-like sales only explains a small part of the sales increase 
in 2008, which means that the acquisition had an important impact. 
 
Sonae Distribuição Sales Evolution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cotec Portugal 
 
 
10.2 – Looking at the sales evolution of the company, is possible to identify a clear leap in sales after the 
acquisition of Carrefour-Portugal. 
 
 
Continente Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sonae Distribuição 
 
10.3 – Continente, the brand who suffered a higher impact with the acquisition, registered an important 
expansion as a result of the acquisition. 
 
*Note: financial results of Sonae Distribuição are presented in Appendix 10.
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Appendix 1 - Economic Concentration of Top 10 retailers 
 
- Evolution: 2000-2005 
 
 
- Situation in 2007 
 
 
Source:  
Deloitte - Global Powers of Retailing 2007 - www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/Global%20Powers%20of%20Retailing_07(3).pdf 
Deloitte - Global Powers of Retailing 2009 – http://public.deloitte.com/media/0460/2009GlobalPowersofRetail_FINAL2.pdf 
 
Appendix 2 – Portuguese retailing evolution (Food Segment) 
 
Source: A.C. Nielsen 
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Evolution of Food-based Stores by Format*, 1987-2004 (%)
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Appendix 3 - Retail formats evolution 
 
* Percentage of sales in Nielsen Food Index  
Source: ACNielsen, ES Research – Research Sectorial. 
http://www.bes.pt/SiteBES/cms.aspx?plg=22af9c17-74b2- f38-9c95-96f1df63703a 
 
 
 
Appendix 4 - Portuguese economy trends 
   
 
Source: Sonae SGPS Management Presentation 1Q08 – June 2008  
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Appendix 5 - Discounts in Portugal 
 
- Discount Evolution in Portugal 
 
 
 
Source: www.sonae.pt - Apresentação MBA AESE, 21 Jan. 05 
 
- Discounts in Portugal vs. Europe 
 
 
Source: A.C. Nielsen 
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Appendix 6 – Private Label Evolution 
 
  
   
 
Source: TNS Worldpanel 2009 (Portugal) – “O Consumidor e a Distribuição”. 12 Feb. 09 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7 – APED Productivity Ranking 2007   
 
 
 
 
Source: APED – Ranking 2007 
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Appendix 8 – Sonae Distribuição Portfolio 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sonae Distribuição 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 9 - Ranking of brand strength in retailing 
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Appendix 10 – Financial Results of Sonae Distribuição, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sonae Distribuição – 2008 Earnings Announcement 
 
 
 
 
